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One of the many puzzling aspects of the Theaetetus is its aim. Just 
what is Plato's project? At the outset of the dialogue, Socrates asks about 
the nature of knowledge. During the course of the dialogue, several 
definitions of knowledge are proposed and rejected. The dialogue ends 
with Socrates advising Theaetetus that any further consideration into the 
nature of knowledge will be improved as a result of their deliberations. 
The dialogue does not establish a definition of knowledge, nor does it give 
definitive criteria for being an object of knowledge. The project of the 
dialogue is simply an open-ended inquiry into the nature of knowledge. 
However, this inquiry is not fruitless. Through the refutations of the 
proposed definitions of knowledge, the seeds of a Platonic doctrine of 
knowledge are sown. The project of this paper is to examine one of these 
refutations and to propose a doctrine of knowledge that grows out of that 
refutation. 
You will find a whole profession to prove that true belief is not 
knowledge...The profession of those paragons of intellect known as 
orators and lawyers. There you have men who use their skill to 
produce conviction, not by instruction, but my making people believe 
whatever they want them to believe. You can hardly imagine teachers 
so clever as to be able, in the short time allowed by the clock, to 
instruct their hearers thoroughly in the true facts of a case of robbery 
or other violence which the hearers had not witnessed...And when a 
jury is rightly convinced of facts which can be known only by an 
eyewitness, then, judging by hearsay and accepting a true belief, they 
are judging without knowledge, although, if they find the right verdict, 
their conviction is correct. 
Th. 2013-b1 
In the Theaetetus, Plato refutes the definition of knowledge as true 
belief through the jury case described above. I shall clarify the import of 
this puzzling passage through the development of Plato's meanings of 
lPlato, Theaetetus. All references to Plato's writings are from the 
translations contained in Plato: The Collected Dialogues, Edith Hamilton 
and Huntington Cairns, cds. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963). 
Title Abbreviations are as follows: Eu., Euthydemus; Ph., Phaedo; R., 
Republic; Soph., Sophist; Th., Theaetetus. 
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"teaching" and "knowledge." In addition, I shall propose an innovative 
interpretation of Plato's doctrine of knowledge. After resolving several 
apparent paradoxes in the jury refutation, I shall discuss Miles Burnyeat's 
erroneous interpretations of this passage. The development of the 
proposed doctrine will aid in understanding Burnyeat's misinterpretation 
of the paradoxes. 
I. The Paradoxes2 
The counter example given in the jury passage contains several 
claims. One cannot teach another facts of a perceptual event. Time is 
somehow a restriction on the instruction of facts of a perceptual event. 
Facts about such an event can only be known by an eyewitness. Plato 
suggests that the decision of a jury as to whether or not a suspect is guilty 
of robbery can be based at best on the jury's acceptance of true beliefs. 
The jury cannot base its decision on knowledge. His reasoning is two-fold: 
a) the jury is not taught, but manipulated through a particular skill of the 
advocates and b) they jury is not made up of eyewitnesses and must 
depend on testimony. The first reason implies that if the jury could be 
taught the facts of the case, then the jury could base its decision on 
knowledge of the crime. The second reason implies that only if the 
members of the jury had been eyewitnesses to the crime could the jury 
base its decision on knowledge of the crime. Two critical and allegedly 
incompatible claims appear to be made here: (1A) that knowledge can be 
acquired through teaching and (IB) that knowledge is only obtained 
through direct perception. Miles Burnyeat has noted that either (1A) or 
(IB) may be sufficient to refute the definition, i.e., to establish that the jury, 
at best, can base its decision on true beliefs and not knowledge of the 
crime and, hence, that knowledge and true beliefs are not identical. In 
order to affirm that (1 A) is sufficient to refute the definition of knowledge 
as true belief, more must be said about Plato's thoughts on teaching. To 
make the case that (IB) is sufficient to refute the same definition, Plato's 
thoughts about perceptual knowledge must be detailed. I shall show that, 
when considered alone, both (1A) and (IB) are sufficient to refute the 
2My formulation of the paradoxes discussed here are reformulations of 
paradoxes which are both presented by Miles Burnyeat and discussed by 
Jonathon Barnes in "Socrates and the Jury," Proceedings from Aristotelian 
Society Supplement 54, (1980): 177. In a longer version of my essay I 
critically analyze Barnes' paradoxes. The paradoxes are first presented as 
they have been discussed in the Burnyeat and Barnes essay. The tentative 
nature of my initial presentation of the paradoxes is due to my 
unwillingness to interpret the jury passage without an understanding of 
the relationship between the key terms in the passage-knowledge and 
teaching. Upon investigating the Platonic conceptions of teaching and 
knowledge, I shall reformulate, and consequently, resolve the paradoxes. 
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definition. Additionally, I shall assess the paradox resulting from the 
combination of (1A) and (IB) -that knowledge can be acquired through no 
means other than perception and that knowledge can be acquired by a 
means other than perception, namely teaching (hereafter referred to as 
the first paradox). 
In relating the above passage to the earlier refutation of knowledge as 
perception, a second apparent paradox emerges. One claim of the jury 
refutation is that perception is necessary for knowledge. However, Plato 
refutes the definition of knowledge as perception by arguing that what can 
be perceived belongs to a different class of objects than what can be 
known. This claim and the refutation combined seem paradoxical. The 
paradox stems from Plato's seeming to maintain (2A) that in order to know 
that perceptual event of a crime, we must perceive it and (2B) that what 
can be perceived is a different sort of object than what can be known. (2A) 
and (2B) combined may entail that to be known some objects at least must 
be perceived and that a single object cannot be both perceived and 
known. An investigation into knowledge in general and perceptual 
knowledge in particular should shed light on this second apparent 
paradox. Having developed the Platonic notions of knowledge and 
teaching, I will return to both of these paradoxes. 
II. A Doctrine of Teaching 
In this section I will investigate Plato's concept of teaching by 
surveying the use of educational terms in the Corpus. Although terms 
such as learning and instruction are referred to in early dialogues and as 
such they may be less than ideal for guiding the interpretation of a later 
dialogue, they may aid in our understanding of the progression of Platonic 
thought. We shall see the later dialogues' usage of educational terms 
mirroring these earlier usages. In order to avoid misunderstandings about 
what entity does the learning for Plato, the investigation begins with an 
explanation of the distinction between soul and person. 
An understanding of Plato's conception of teaching is best introduced 
through the perspective of how educational notions relate to Plato's 
soul/person ontological distinction. Before discussing the soul/person 
distinction, Plato's soul/body distinction must be addressed. In arguing 
that the existence of forms precedes the existence of bodies, Plato 
establishes that the soul is among the primal things, older than all bodies 
and the"prime source of all their changes and transformations" (Laws 
10.892a). At Timaeus 43c the process of the soul's migration to the body is 
compared to the creation of the world. The creator..."fastening the courses 
of the immortal soul in a body which was in a state of perpetual influx and 
efflux." The body is initially rocked by sensation but becomes steady and 
rational once it is ensouled. In the Phaedo, Plato gives comparative 
characteristics of the soul and body. Soul is said to be immortal, 
intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, and even self consistent and invariable. 
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Conversely, the body is human, mortal, multiform, unintelligible, 
dissoluble and never self consistent (Ph. 80). In the same dialogue, Plato 
describes the soul as a long-lived thing that wears out several short-lived 
bodies much as a person wears out several coats in a life time (Ph. 87d). 
While this soul/body distinction will aid in our understanding of 
knowledge, it is the soul/person distinction through which Plato 
understands education. Based on the ontological distinction between the 
soul and body, I shall define a person as an ensouled body for the purpose 
of this paper. At Phaedo 75e, Plato equates learning with a person's 
recovery of knowledge of the forms that the person's soul lost at the 
moment of birth (or migration). Learning is a process of recollecting the 
invariable forms through the use of a person's senses upon objects in the 
sensible, changing world. A person is said to know when, through 
recollection, he recovers and retains the knowledge that was lost at birth. 
At Meno 81 d, Plato introduces two types of learning: higher learning—the 
soul's acquisition of knowledge, and learning as meant in ordinary 
language—a man's recollection of a single piece of knowledge. The 
characterizations of learning in the Phaedo and Meno are compatible with 
the theory of knowledge via recollection-the doctrine introduced in the 
Meno. Gearly, both the Phaedo and Meno accounts of learning apply to a 
person's learning knowledge of the forms. It is the soul that initially 
acquires the forms and it is through a person's recovery via recollection 
that a person is said to have knowledge of the forms. 
Educational terms are further discussed in the Euthydemus and 
Protagoras. At Euthydemus 278, Plato discusses two senses of the word 
"learn" with regard to a person: A) "when one has no knowledge at the 
beginning about something, and then afterwards gets the knowledge," and 
B) "when one already having the knowledge uses this knowledge to 
examine the same thing done or spoken." Socrates' discussion of absolute 
equality in the Phaedo produces examples of both of these senses of the 
word "learn." Recollecting, the form of absolute equality, is an example of 
the first sense of learn. Using the knowledge of absolute equality to 
describe two approximately equal sticks in the sensible world is an 
example of the second sense of "learning" (Ph. 74d). This dual 
characterization of learning is not presented in terms of the soul acquiring 
knowledge, but rather as a person acquiring knowledge. A person has no 
knowledge of the forms until this knowledge is learned in the first sense 
through recollection prompted by the perception of instances of the forms 
in the perceptible world. Once possessing knowledge of the forms, a 
person uses his knowledge of the forms to learn, in the second sense, 
about sensible particulars that reflect the forms. 
At Protagoras 321b, instruction is differentiated in to two types-
professional, instruction geared to becoming a practitioner, and liberal, 
instruction that provides a foundation from which one recollects the forms. 
Later in the dialogue (326a-c), the occurrences of the ideals of virtue and 
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goodness as perceived through poetry and music are given as examples of 
liberal instruction. This second type of instruction seems to mesh with the 
Euthydemus conception of learning. Instructors are here referred to as 
teachers. Children are taught in the skills of reading, writing, and music. 
Hence they learn skills through which they are able to recognize the forms 
that their souls had forgotten at birth. It is hoped that the performance of 
these skills will engender recollection. 
In the Sophist (229a-d), Thcaetetus and the Stranger discuss two sorts 
of instruction, each of which is said to remedy a corresponding type of 
ignorance. The first sort of instruction is the "teaching of handicraft arts." 
Such teaching is labeled "education." However, through a description of 
ignorance, the Stranger mentions another sort of instruction that is said to 
correspond to "one very large and bad sort of ignorance" (Soph. 229c), 
namely, stupidity. Stupidity is exemplified by one who thinks he knows 
when he does not in fact know. Such ignorance is corrected through 
instruction via the dialectical process of admonition, that is, making one 
aware of inconsistencies in his thought. The scheme of instruction in the 
Sophist, then, provides for both knowledge of handicrafts, which is 
obtained through teaching, and elimination of knowledge-limiting 
conceptual obstacles, which is achieved through admonition. In the 
Sophist, Plato seems to reserve the use of "teaching" for reference to the 
instruction of skills. 
Although the Republic contains very little about learning and 
instruction, a good deal is said in this dialogue about education. The 
concept of education here allows for the inclusion of instruction and 
admonition and also reveals a need for instruction to precede admonition. 
Children are trained early in music, and upon acquiring skill are given 
music whose speeches and tales reflect the form of the good in speech, 
harmony, and rhythm. "When children in their earliest play are imbued 
with the spirit of law and order through their music,... (the lawful) spirit 
awaits on them in all things and fosters their growth, and restores and sets 
up again whatever was overthrown in the other (lawless) state." (R. 425a4-9) 
In conclusion, each step of the educational process requires that 
students be prepared to acquire knowledge so that ignorance is not 
promoted. Teaching is something very different from one who knows 
conveying information to one who does not know, rather it is one who 
knows how to instill the appropriate disposition for recollection instilling 
this disposition in another. Children must be trained early in order to 
insure that all their training will result in the virtuous knowledge of the 
forms. Early training focuses on discipline that will be needed later in 
order to avoid sources of ignorance. Although the Republic's discussions 
of education center on the training that instills the proper disposition for 
recollection of the forms, the doctrine of knowledge I shall argue for 
maintains that in order to acquire or recollect any type of knowledge, a 
person must fulfill certain conditions. The conditions for recollection of 
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the knowledge of a form is that one be exposed to sensible particulars that 
are instances of the form and that one has the disposition of a 
contradiction-free set of beliefs. As we shall see, a condition for knowledge 
of cognized external objects is that one be in a position to perceive the 
objects. In resolving the paradoxes previously presented, I shall return to 
these Platonic conceptions of education. 
III. The Combined Doctrine of Knowledge 
The aim of this paper is to produce an interpretation of a doctrine of 
knowledge that will enable the doctrines of knowledge found in earlier 
dialogues to yield a resolution to the paradoxes under discussion. When 
viewing the Theaetetus as an open-ended inquiry into the nature of 
knowledge, this aim may best be achieved by allowing the conclusions of 
the refutations in the Theaetetus to enrich the doctrines of knowledge 
found in the Phaedo and the Republic. In this section these doctrines will 
be discussed. It is assumed that each refutation in the Theaetetus is a 
rejection of a particular definition of knowledge. The critical task in 
uncovering a doctrine of knowledge that underlies the refutation is to 
understand both the definition to be refuted and its grounds for rejection. 
It is not unreasonable to suppose that Plato, in the later dialogues, 
maintains a doctrine of knowledge introduced in earlier dialogues. This 
will be the case, at any rate, so long as a single doctrine can be detected 
throughout the progression of the dialogues. 
Plato first discusses knowledge in the Meno. In explaining how one 
can know something previously unknown, Socrates demonstrates that, 
when asked the proper question, even a slave boy can discover a 
geometrical truth previously unknown to him. Thought of in terms of the 
description of education discussed above, the slave boy 'learns' not by 
being told the truth by someone who knows, but by being appropriately 
prepared to recall the truth. Plato develops this method of acquiring 
knowledge into the doctrine of innate ideas in the Phaedo (75b-e). The 
eternal unchanging forms are known through recollection with the aid of 
perceptible objects. His doctrine of innate ideas establishes one type of 
knowledge-knowledge of the forms. 
The Lovers of Beauty/Beautiful Things passages in the fifth book of 
the Republic (5.476c7-d3) might plausibly be taken to assert a broader 
doctrine of knowledge. Here Plato writes of "A man whose thought 
recognizes beauty in itself, and is able to distinguish that self-beauty and 
things that participate in it, and neither supposes the participants to be it 
nor it the participants." This passage appears to delineate two types of 
knowledge: knowledge of the forms and knowledge of cognized external 
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3While carrying out the investigation of the concept of knowledge, my 
reference to beautiful things as cognized external objects, instead of as 
simply sensible particulars, shall be explained. 
4Before establishing that this doctrine is consistent with the Theaetetus, I 
must note that I shall not assume that Plato is committed to the claim that 
there are only two sorts of knowledge. Although I can find no textual 
evidence in the Theaetetus to support a third sort of knowledge, it is 
reasonable to assume that if Plato thought we could have knowledge of the 
forms and of cognized external objects, he might maintain that we are able 
to have knowledge of other types of objects-for instance, logical truths. It 
objects. 3 A man in the mental state of knowing is said to be able to 
distinguish forms (the self-beautiful) from cognized external objects 
(things that participate in the self-beautiful). There are several reasons for 
interpreting the passage as referring to knowledge. In the case of 
distinguishing one object from another, one must first have the ability to 
recognize how the objects differ in order to have knowledge that they 
differ. This claim is defended by Plato in the Theaetetus' third refutation 
of knowledge as true belief together with an account. Actually, such an 
ability is necessary whether the distinction is based on true belief or 
knowledge. Second, the man in the passage is described as being awake 
as opposed to dreaming; one who dreams cannot apprehend forms. Third, 
the man above is also described as being in the mental state of knowing, 
as having knowledge (R.5.476d ff.) I take the Euthydemus' description of 
learning to mirror the Republic doctrine of knowledge. The forms are 
recollected through the learned disposition. These recollected forms are 
in turn used to acquire knowledge of cognized external objects. 
The doctrine of the Phaedo differs from that of the Republic in that it 
deals solely with knowledge of the forms and hence makes no mention of 
knowledge of external objects. That Plato holds a different doctrine of 
knowledge in the Phaedo than in the Republic does not present a problem 
in interpretation so long as either the two doctrines are compatible or, if 
they are not compatible, Plato has presented good reasons to forgo the 
earlier doctrine. I take the doctrine in the Republic to be compatible with 
the doctrine in Phaedo. Both doctrines hold that there is a knowledge of 
the forms. The Phaedo doctrine explains how such knowledge is acquired. 
The root of the Republic doctrine (Book VI 70-80) maintains that without 
knowledge of the form of the beautiful, one cannot know beautiful things, 
but merely judges them to be beautiful. Thus, the Combined Doctrine 
holds A) that we acquire knowledge of the forms through recollection by 
use of our senses and B) that only with such knowledge are we able to 
know cognized external objects. However, in order to apply this doctrine to 
the refutation in the Theaetetus under discussion, I must argue that this 
broader doctrine of knowledge is consistent with the views put forth about 
knowledge in the Theaetetus.4 
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Early in the Theaetetus (146d) asked what knowledge is, Theaetetus 
lists two sorts of knowledge—the sciences that one can learn from 
Theodorus and the crafts of workmen. Socrates does not challenge the 
possibility that there is more than one type of knowledge. Rather, he urges 
Theaetetus to look for what the sorts of knowledge he has listed have in 
common. Here at the outset of the dialogue, Socrates, when presented 
with several sorts of knowledge, offers no reason that would negate the 
possibility of a pluralistic doctrine of knowledge such as the Combined 
Doctrine from the Phaedo and the Republic. Although it is not uncommon 
for Plato's Socrates to begin an investigation into the nature of something 
with a list of the examples of that thing only to discard this list for an ideal 
of the investigated thing, Plato's methodology is different in the 
Theaetetus. He does not discard the list nor does he directly investigate 
the nature of the sorts of knowledge that Theodorus lists. Instead, Plato 
gnaws at the question of whether knowledge is perception until he gives a 
satisfactory answer in the refutation at 186c-e. 
The Combined Doctrine of knowledge is given added meaning by 
considering the conclusion of Plato's refutation of knowledge as 
perception. "Knowledge is nothing but perception" (Th. 151e3) is 
ultimately refuted by the identification of a difference between the two— 
that knowledge, but not perception, can apprehend ousia (existence, 
essence). Yet in the argument against the notion that one cannot think 
what is not, after claiming that perception is not knowledge, Socrates 
establishes that when we perceive, we perceive what exists, just as when we 
think, we think what exists. An understanding of Plato's theory of 
perception as well as the meaning of ousia here are critical to interpreting 
this apparent contradiction. 
Plato presents the Secret Doctrine theory of perception earlier in the 
Theaetetus. Modrak has persuasively argued for accepting this theory as 
Plato's.5 The process of visual perception according to the Secret Doctrine 
is described as follows: 
As soon, then, as an eye and something else whose structure is 
adjusted to the eye come within range and give birth to the whiteness 
together with its cognate perception—things that would never have 
come into existence if either of the two had approached anything else-
-then it is that, as the vision from the eyes and the whiteness from the 
thing that joins in giving birth to the color pass in the space between, 
the eye becomes filled with vision and now sees, and becomes, not 
vision, but a seeing eye, while the other parent of the color is saturated 
may be the case that Plato might have held a pluralistic doctrine of 
knowledge that was inclusive of, but not limited to, the combined doctrine. 
5Modrak, D. K., "Perception and Judgement in the Theaetetus," Phronesis, 
(1981): 38. 
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A SEEING EYE COGNATE PERCEPTION OP 
A WHITE THING: DATUM 
The theory is generalized in terms of all types of sensory perception as 
follows: the two immediate products resulting from the interaction of a 
sense organ and a sensible object are the perceiving organ and a cognate 
perception of the object. For simplicity's sake I shall refer to the sense 
organ as the subject, the sensible particular as the object, and the cognate 
perception as the datum of the interaction. Although the perceiving organ 
is also a product of the interaction, further reference to it is unnecessary as 
it merely renames the organ upon activation of the organ's capabilities. 
In his refutation of the thesis that knowledge is perception, Socrates is 
asserting that the operation of perception alone can produce such a 
datum as the perception of a white thing. When Socrates asserts that 
when a person sees, hears, and touches something, he sees, hears, and 
touches a thing that is (Th. 188c), he is contending that one of the products 
of the operation of perception is the apprehension of the existence of a 
perception of sensible parttculars-thosc things that we can see, hear, and 
touch (colors, sounds, textures, etc.). To be precise, the datum is the 
apprehension that there is a white thing. However apprehending a datum 
is not having knowledge of an external object. Something more is needed 
to get from this single datum to knowledge of a cognized external object. 
An additional epistcmic requirement on the apprehension of a 
perception of an object is revealed in the refutation of knowledge as 
perception. This additional requirement also suggests that the forms help 
us to distinguish objects. At 186b, Plato details the sort of mental reflection 
with whiteness and becomes, on its side, not whiteness, but a white 
thing, be it stick or stone or whatever else may chance to be so 
colored. (Th.l562-e3) See Diagram below. 
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about an object necessary for it to become an object of knowledge. The 
objects of knowledge in this instance are the hardness of a hard thing, and 
the softness of a soft thing, both are products of the operation of 
perception. At 186b6-9, Plato maintains that the ousia of hardness and 
softness and the fact that hardness and softness exist, and their 
oppositeness and the ousia of their oppositeness are all things that the 
mind judges through an internal process of reflection and comparison. 
Ousia may mean being in terms of an object's existence or being in terms 
of an object's essential nature.6 Because Plato refers to the existence of 
hardness and softness independent of his use of ousia in this passage, a 
case can be made for ousia meaning an object's essential nature here. In 
the case of data, we know they exist because they are products of the 
process of perception. The existence of the forms according to Plato's 
ontology is independent of any human mental process. It would seem that 
existence is established in each case independent of ousia. If ousia were 
interpreted as an object's essential nature the passage in question would 
read as follows. The essential nature of hardness and softness and the fact 
that they exist, and their oppositeness and the essential nature of their 
oppositeness are all things that the mind judges through an internal 
process of reflection and comparison. Hereafter, ousia will refer to an 
object's essential nature. 
I believe what Plato means by reflecting is reflecting on the nature of 
the object of knowledge, its ousia, and what is to be compared is the object 
with past experience through the use of forms. Hence, the mental 
reflection necessary with regard to knowledge of external objects includes 
reflection on the nature of the object and comparison of the object to past 
experience of external objects via one's knowledge of the forms. A 
cognized external object is a cognition made up of perceptions or data. 
Perceptions are rooted in the variable, unstable realm of becoming, but 
come to existence in the cognitive realm. The operation of perception 
begins in the realm of becoming. However, the Secret Doctrine maintains 
that the nature of the apprehension of a perception of a sensible particular 
is epistemic. The theory of perception tells us what conditions are 
necessary for successful perception of the world, i.e., what conditions are 
necessary for a successful transfer from the realm of becoming to the 
cognitive realm. In order to insure that the datum is indeed accurate one 
must be sure the usual conditions for perceptual success exist. For 
example, that one's vision is not hindered by external conditions or by the 
distance of the perceived object from the subject-the eye. Additionally, 
prior knowledge (of forms) allows one to produce the additional mental 
activity of comparison to transform data into an external object. The mind, 
through its awareness of the ousia of the external object, combines this 
6The Modrak article contains a discussion of the possible meanings of 
ousia in this passage. 
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single datum of the object with other data of the same object into the 
cognition of the external object. For example, the datum of the white thing 
and with the data of a several edged thing may by compared to previously 
perceived instances of the forms of squareness, straightness and equality 
to produce the cognition of the external object of a white box. The mind's 
knowledge of the forms of squareness, straightness and equality allows the 
mind to combine data in this manner. At any given moment, several 
human perceivers can talk about the cognized external object, provided 
they possess knowledge of the appropriate forms, because their sense 
organs are structurally similar and the object's structure remains constant, 
as do the external conditions of perception. The pcrceiver's awareness of 
the ousia of the external object—that it is a complex of data transformed 
into an external object via the comparative use of the forms-transforms 
the possession of infallible perceptions into knowledge of the external 
object. I have hinted here as to how we might use forms to produce 
cognized external objects. Much more must be said about this use of the 
forms in attaining knowledge of cognized external objects. 
In his refutation of knowledge as true belief, Socrates refers to an 
instance of knowing an external object (a violent crime) as a case of 
knowing that is not identical to true belief. Under the Combined Doctrine 
of knowledge, all that Socrates has established is that one cannot acquire 
knowledge of a perceptual object solely through true belief. One needs 
initial data of the crime and the contribution of ousia of the external object 
which comes only when one has knowledge of the forms. 
In refuting the first two versions of true belief plus an account as 
knowledge, Plato suggests nothing that would negate the Combined 
Doctrine of knowledge. The Combined Doctrine holds A) that we acquire 
knowledge of the forms through recollection by use of our senses and B) 
that only with such knowledge are we able to know cognized external 
objects. This doctrine is consistent with the restrictions that knowledge be 
such that a person who merely can signify what he thinks on a subject (the 
first rejected interpretation of knowledge as true belief plus logos) does 
not have knowledge of that subject and that a person who only can provide 
a complete catalogue of elements of a perceptible object (the second 
rejected interpretation of knowledge as true belief plus logos) cannot be 
said to have knowledge of the object. The Combined Doctrine's relation to 
the third refutation of knowledge as true belief plus logos, meaning true 
belief plus an account, cannot be determined until the meaning of 
"account" is made clear. Clarifying the meaning of this term and 
reconciling the new doctrine with this refutation is the next step in 
developing the Combined Doctrine. However, this step is beyond the 
scope of this paper. 
Under the assumption of a successful reconciliation of the third 
refutation and the Combined Doctrine, a few conclusions about the 
outcome of the dialogue may be drawn. Even though at the outset 
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Socrates insists on searching for a single characterization of knowledge, in 
the end, he implores us to learn from the inconsistencies revealed by the 
refutations. It would seem that a characterization of knowledge as true 
belief plus an awareness of the ousia of the object to be known may be 
satisfactory. However, the necessary conditions for the acquisition of each 
type of knowledge I have mentioned arc very different. Knowledge is 
acquired quite differently in the case of forms than in the case of cognized 
external objects, hence a case can be made for breaking the 
characterization in two. True belief about the forms may be instilled 
through instruction, while ousia of the forms may come only with 
recollection. True belief about a cognized external object is rooted in the 
operation of perception, while an awareness of the ousia of such an object 
can only emerge upon having knowledge of the forms. 
IV. The Resolution of the Paradoxes 
Given the discussions of knowledge and teaching, we can now 
untangle the paradoxes of the jury case. The jury is after knowledge of a 
cognized external event-a crime. In the Greek legal system, victims and 
alleged criminals were allotted a limited amount of time in which to 
present their case. The jury based its decision on the two parties' 
speeches. The jury had not witnessed the crime and hence could not meet 
the necessary dispositional conditions to obtain knowledge of that event. 
One's knowledge of the cognized external event is rooted in his having 
data of the event. Without perceiving the event, the best they jury could 
hope for in arriving at a decision is true belief. 
We have seen why "you can hardly imagine teachers so clever as to be 
able, in the short time allowed by the clock, to instruct their hearers 
thoroughly in the true facts of a case of robbery or other violence that the 
hearers had not witnessed." (Th. 201al2-b3) First, a teacher's task is aimed 
directly at knowledge of the forms, and only indirectly at knowledge of 
external events, such as knowledge of a crime. The teacher enables the 
student to be in the best position in which to recollect forms i) through 
exposing the student to instances of the forms, and ii) through 
admonishing the student's contradictory viewpoints that lead to ignorance. 
Only after forms have been recollected can one use the knowledge of the 
forms to provide the ousia of the external event necessary to transform 
data into knowledge of the event. One might hold that such knowledge is 
in a way acquired through teaching, since forms are used in acquiring this 
knowledge. However, even if the knowledge that they jury sought were 
knowledge of the forms, the teaching process that instills in students a 
disposition to recollect forms takes year to complete. The time allowed by 
the clock is insufficient for this purpose. Additionally, no teacher can 
impart one of the requirements necessary to obtain knowledge of the 
robbery—the direct perception of the crime. A teacher cannot turn back 
the clock and make sure the jury is located such that it will be sure to 
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witness the crime. A teacher can aid only in recollecting forms which the 
perceiver will use to transform data of the event's perceptual 
characteristics into knowledge of the external event. 
The first paradox of the jury case is a product of the following two 
claims: (1A) that knowledge can be acquired through teaching and (IB) 
that knowledge is only obtained through direct perception. It is apparent 
now that (1A) alone is sufficient to refute the definition of knowledge as 
true belief. The appropriate question to ask is what is it about teaching 
that makes it impossible for the jury to obtain knowledge in this case 
through teaching. As suggested above, the process of teaching involved in 
recollecting the knowledge of the forms is lengthy. The prosecutor and 
defendant only have a limited amount of time in which to present their 
cases. Hence, even if such knowledge could be taught (and it cannot), the 
prosecutor and defendant do not have enough time to teach such 
knowledge to the jury. The Combined Doctrine of knowledge allows for 
the truth of (1 A). Knowledge of the forms is acquired through teaching in 
that teaching both eliminates contradictions from a student's set of beliefs 
and exposes the student to sensible instances of the forms. Plato 
maintains that these two ingredients are necessary for the recollection of, 
and consequently knowledge of the forms. 
The meaning of (IB) is ambiguous. (1B) may mean that through 
perception and no other means can one obtain knowledge. This meaning 
is wrong. Plato clearly maintains that admonition is a necessary part of the 
educational process and, hence, a necessary part of obtaining knowledge 
of the forms. Admonition is not essentially perceptual. Hence, knowledge 
of the forms is obtained in part through some non-perceptual means. A 
better meaning for (IB) may be that only through some use of perception 
is any type of knowledge obtained. Perception's role in the acquisition of 
knowledge of a cognized external object was detailed in the above 
discussion. Perception's role in the acquisition of knowledge of the forms 
is somewhat subtle. A necessary part of the process of education is 
exposure to instances of forms in sensible particulars. For example, a 
student hears an instance of harmony and sees instances of equality and 
beauty. Such hearing and seeing are examples of perceptions that are 
necessary for the recollection of knowledge of forms. Hence, the 
acquisition of the knowledge of forms and knowledge of cognized external 
objects requires perception. Both arms of the apparent paradox are true. 
Contrary to Burnyeat's suggestion, (IB) taken alone, under this 
interpretation, does not refute the definition of knowledge as true belief. 
However, Plato makes no claims that it can refute the definition. The 
unproblematic reformulation of the apparent paradox reads: OA') 
knowledge of forms is acquired partially through teaching and (IB') the 
acquisition of all knowledge requires perception. 
The second paradox is rooted in Plato's seeming to maintain (2A) that 
in order to know an object, we must perceive it and (2B) that what can be 
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perceived is a different sort of object than what can be known. The 
resulting paradox reads that to be known, an object must be cognized and 
that one object cannot be both perceived and known. According to the 
Combined Doctrine, we can know forms and cognized external objects. 
Forms are not perceived: we perceive instances of forms. External objects 
are not directly perceived: the data from which these objects are cognized 
are perceived. Therefore, neither forms nor external objects are 
perceived. (2A) is false and the paradox is resolved. Data are perceived. 
The datum (a white thing) and the cognized external object (a white box) 
are two distinct entities. Hence, the Combined Doctrine renders (2B) true; 
what can be perceived (data) is a different sort of object than what can be 
known (forms and external objects). 
V. Conclusion 
My analyses of knowledge and teaching have shown that knowledge 
cannot be directly transmitted through teaching. The acquisition of both 
sorts of knowledge requires the possession of a prior disposition. 
Acquisition of knowledge of a perceptual event requires the knower to be 
in a position to perceive that event and to possess knowledge of forms in 
order to cognize the event from perceptions. Knowledge of the forms is 
acquired only by someone possessing the disposition to recollect the 
forms. This disposition is acquired partially by being taught skills, partially 
by being exposed to instances of the forms as manifested in these skills, 
and partially by the elimination of sources of ignorance through 
admonishment. Teaching's partial contribution to the acquisition of the 
disposition to recollect forms is its only contribution to knowledge of the 
forms. Knowledge of the forms is obtained through perception and 
through recollection. Neither sort of knowledge is transmittable solely 
through teaching nor acquired solely through perception. 
I have argued for a particular doctrine of knowledge in Plato's 
writings.7 An understanding of this doctrine has aided in interpreting the 
7 l f the doctrine of knowledge and the philosophy of education that 1 have 
argued for are to hold up, my account of each must be consistent with the 
writings of the later dialogues. Additional support for my interpretation of 
the Platonic philosophy of education is to be found in the Laws. Like the 
Republic, the Laws has much to say about education. Education is 
described as including instruction and admonition (7.788). True education 
requires practice of necessary preliminary instruction (1.643b-e) and is 
self-correcting (1.644). Such preliminary instruction is compulsory for all 
children (7.804e) and will be composed of training in music and 
gymnastics (2.672). Clearly, Plato's philosophy of education in the Laws is 
consistent with his philosophy of education in the Republic. 
Support of my interpretation for the Platonic doctrine of 
knowledge can be found in the discussion of knowledge in Philebus. Early 
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obscure jury refutation. If the project of the Theaetetus is taken to be the 
search for what is common to all sorts of knowledge, the apparent 
commonality is that whenever we know something, we know its essential 
nature. With further research, a connection between this commonality 
and the third definition of true belief plus logos may be established and 
the Combined Doctrine enriched. 
in this dialogue, Socrates maintains that "knowledge taken in its entirety 
will seem to be a plurality in which this knowledge is unlike that..." (13e7-8). 
Knowledge is divided into technical knowledge of the handicrafts and 
knowledge concerned with education (55d). Technical knowledge is 
further divided into superior knowledge involving precision and the 
inferior, limited knowledge of the numbers and kinds of letters and 
musical notes that is a basic requirement for reading and music (17b). 
Most interesting in the discussion of knowledge in the Philebus are two 
passages that mesh with the plurality of knowledge of external objects and 
knowledge of the forms. The first is a rather lengthy passage that 
describes the mental dialectical process. Once an object is perceived, one 
uses this process in order to make a judgment about the object (38c-e). 
Here, I interpret Plato to be describing the mental activity required for the 
apprehension of the existence of a perceptual object. The second 
interesting passage describes the most exact sort of knowledge: "the 
cognition of that which is, that which exists in reality, ever unchanged." 
(57b) This is a clear reference to the knowledge of the forms. The 
Philebus, then, evidently supports the doctrine of knowledge I have been 
advocating. 
